Background. In March 2011, a multidisciplinary team investigated 2 human cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection, detected through population-based active surveillance for influenza in Bangladesh, to assess transmission and contain further spread.
From November 2003 to July 2016, 854 confirmed human cases of infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A (H5N1) virus have been reported worldwide [1] , with a case fatality proportion of 53%. As of December 2011, a total of 523 HPAI H5N1 poultry outbreaks from 52 out of 64 districts had been reported in Bangladesh [2, 3] (Figure 1 ). The only confirmed human case of HPAI H5N1 virus infection in Bangladesh before this report was identified in 2008 in a child with mild illness through a population-based active surveillance for respiratory and febrile illness conducted in Kamalapur, Dhaka, where the child lived [4] . The event suggested that Bangladesh's routine hospital-based influenza surveillance might systematically miss the detection of mild HPAI H5N1 cases.
In Bangladesh, persons with mild illness do not usually attend hospitals for primary care, with about 7-17 cases of influenza associated influenza-like illness in patients <5 years of age per 100 person-years of hospital attendance [5, 6] . In contrast, another study conducted in a rural area during the 2010 influenza season reported that 51% of patients with severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) sought care in a hospital or clinic [7] . Bangladesh's routine hospital-based surveillance for influenza started in 2007 in 6 public and 6 private hospitals widely distributed across the country. In these sentinel sites, a subset of patients with influenza-like illness seeking care as outpatients and hospitalized patients with SARI are enrolled in the surveillance and tested for influenza using real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) of nasopharyngeal swab samples [8] . Since inception of this program, the sampling scheme has been adjusted over time, based on laboratory testing capacity and available resources.
From September 2010 to June 2011, all identified case patients with SARI and the first 5 with severe pneumonia (among children aged <5 years) in each month from each of the hospital were being tested for influenza. No sampling was being performed among patients with influenzalike illness seeking care in the outpatient department. On the other hand, through the longitudinal population-based surveillance in Kamalapur, >6600 households (or 30 000 participants) with children <5 years old, selected using a stratified cluster sampling from a population of 200 000 residents in an area of 4 km 2 , were under active surveillance for influenza since 2004 [9, 10] . Twice every week, teams collect information about specific illness signs during the previous 7 days, visiting each household and using standardized calendar questionnaires. As part of this surveillance, from every fifth child with acute respiratory or febrile illness, a nasopharyngeal wash (NPW) specimen is collected and tested for influenza virus, using rRT-PCR and culture in Madin-Darby canine kidney cells. In the wake of pandemic influenza, enhanced surveillance was started in this surveillance area in 2009, which included collection and rRT-PCR testing of NPW specimens for influenza viruses from all children aged <5 years presenting with fever or respiratory illness [10] .
Two human cases of influenza A (H5N1) virus infection were detected through the Kamalapur surveillance system in 2011, the first on 13 March (case A) and another on 15 March (case B). Within 24 hours after the first case was detected, the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research of the government of Bangladesh and the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Diseases Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b) formed a multidisciplinary outbreak investigation team consisting of epidemiologists, clinicians, veterinarians, virologists, and social scientists to conduct an outbreak investigation.
The objectives of this investigation were to confirm HPAI H5N1 virus infection, to assess the possible source(s) of infection and modes of transmission, to search for possible additional cases due to human-to-human transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus, and to contain further spread. The outbreak investigation team also collected clinical data to characterize illness severity and duration of symptoms and signs.
METHODS

Epidemiological Investigation
Using a structured questionnaire, we collected the age, sex, and clinical history during the 14 days before NPW specimen collection of the patients who tested positive for influenza A subtype H5 viral RNA by rRT-PCR. Because both patients were <5 years old, we interviewed their parents as their proxies.
Using a structured questionnaire and open ended in-depth interviews, we explored the potential exposures of the case patients, including touching, handling, slaughtering or butchering, or being in close proximity to (within 1 m) well-appearing, sick, or dead poultry or wild birds and uncooked poultry products during the 2 weeks before the onset of illness in the child. We inquired about the patients' travel history and possible close exposure to humans with acute respiratory illness or to a person who had died of respiratory illness of unknown cause during the same period. We also explored the history of poultry or wild bird sickness or die-offs in the neighboring area in Kamalapur during the 4 weeks before illness onset. For patient A in particular, the investigation extended to her paternal grandparent's house in a village 30 km southeast of Dhaka, where the patient went 5 days before illness onset and stayed for 3 days. We used a structured questionnaire to ask households in the village whether they had seen sick poultry or birds within 4 weeks of patient A's illness onset.
We defined a case patient's potential infectious period as 1 day before the onset of illness to 1 week after the last identification of H5 viral RNA in follow-up NPW specimens. Those who came within 1 m of a case patient during the infectious period were identified as close contacts. We instructed the case patient's family members to communicate with surveillance staff if any close contact became ill. Surveillance field workers also monitored close contacts for respiratory symptoms during their weekly visits to case patient households. Using a structured questionnaire, we interviewed close contacts to determine whether they experience fever, cough, runny nose, sore throat, or difficulty breathing during the same period.
Sample Collection and Laboratory Investigation
We collected follow-up NPW specimens from the case patients ( Figure 2 ). On the first day of the investigation, we collected NPW specimens from the patients' asymptomatic parents. We collected paired serum samples from both patients and their family caregivers, with the first serum sample obtained within 15 days of the patient's symptom onset and the second collected 3 weeks after the first. We collected a single serum sample from contacts between 21 to 90 days after the last exposure to the 2 case patients.
All NPW and nasopharyngeal swab specimens were tested with rRT-PCR at the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research and icddr,b for influenza A and B viruses. Specimens positive for influenza A specimens were further tested for subtypes H1, H3, H1pdm09, and H5 [11] . All clinical specimens were also shipped frozen to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta for virus isolation, molecular characterization, testing for antiviral resistance, and serology. Human serum samples were tested by means of microneutralization and hemagglutination inhibition assays for antibodies to 2 contemporary HPAI H5N1 viruses circulating in Bangladesh in 2011 [12, 13] . One of the virus strains isolated from patient A (clade 2.2.2.1) was used as antigen to detect clade 2.2.2.1-specific antibody. An HPAI A (H5N1) virus isolated from a crow (clade 2.3.2.1a) in 2011 was also included to assess seroconversion across clades detected in Bangladesh [14] . The geometric mean neutralizing antibody titers were calculated using 2 replicate tests with a starting serum dilution of 1:10. According to World Health Organization (WHO) criteria, seroconversion was defined as a ≥4-fold rise in neutralization antibody titer for H5N1 virus based on testing of an acute and convalescent serum specimen, with the convalescent neutralizing antibody titer ≥40 [12] . A seropositive result was defined as an HPAI H5N1 virus neutralizing antibody titer ≥40 (equivalent to the WHO protocol criterion of ≥80) [15, 16] .
We collected poultry and wild bird samples from the case patient households, their neighboring area, and the locations visited by the case patients during the 2 weeks before their illness. We collected swab samples from the frozen chicken meat and viscera stored in the freezer of patient A's house. We collected chicken fecal samples from 2 live bird markets located close to the houses of the case patients in the Kamalapur neighborhood. In each of the 2 markets, we pooled swab samples collected from 10 broiler chickens and from 10 indigenous chickens. We collected swab samples from all birds in viral transport medium.
Swab samples from chickens, ducks, quails, crows, and environment were tested for influenza viruses by rRT-PCR at the icddr,b and the CDC. Virus isolation and full molecular characterization of resultant virus isolates were done at the CDC. Handling of infectious materials was performed in compliance with biosafety level 3 containment, including enhancements required by the US Department of Agriculture and the Select Agents program [17] .
Ethics Statement
All case patients and their families provided written informed consent to participate in the Kamalapur respiratory and febrile illness surveillance, approved by the icddr,b Ethical Review Committee before the outbreak. The committee reviewed and approved a protocol for H5N1 outbreak investigations. All human study participants gave informed verbal consent for participation in the investigations. We sought informed verbal consent from the parents before obtaining information about minors.
RESULTS
Epidemiological Findings
Patient A Patient A, a 13-month-old girl, developed a cough on 5 March 2011, followed by fever and loose stool (Figure 2) . She visited the icddr,b Kamalapur field clinic on 9 March. At examination, she had fever (39°C) with otherwise normal findings ( Table 1) . A project physician classified her as having a case of suspected enteric fever and collected NPW and blood specimens from her according to the protocol for the ongoing respiratory and febrile disease surveillance [18, 19] . No organism was isolated from blood culture. The NPW specimen tested positive by rRT-PCR for influenza A (H5N1) on 13 March. On 14 March, the patient's parents reported that she had been afebrile since 11 March, but she still had cough and loose stool. Follow-up NPW specimens from patient A collected on 14 and 17 March tested positive for influenza A (H5). She was treated with oseltamivir, starting from 16 March, because she was still coughing. She never had severe illness or required hospitalization, and she recovered fully.
Seven days before her illness onset, patient A's mother bought 7 chickens from a door-to-door vendor. The vendor slaughtered, defeathered, and skinned the chickens inside patient A's home while patient A was present. Her father handled the chickens, washed his hands afterward only with water, and then held his daughter in his lap. Patient A's great-grandmother, who had a previous diagnosis of bronchial asthma, was had fever, cough and respiratory distress during patient A's visit to her house. The great-grandmother recovered a week later after taking bronchodilators prescribed by a physician. In patient A's grandparents' village, 10 of the 31 surrounding households interviewed had sick poultry, and 8 families reported poultry deaths within the 4 weeks before patient A's illness onset. There were also reports of crow die-offs in the village, and the investigative team observed 1 sick and 5 dead crows in the village during their visit.
We interviewed 27 of 28 close contacts of patient A. Among them, only 1, a healthcare worker, reported any respiratory symptoms at the time of the interview. A NPW specimen collected from the symptomatic healthcare worker within 24 hours of symptom onset tested negative for influenza viruses. One contact, a neighbor, was not available for an interview despite repeated attempts.
Patient B
Patient B, a 31-month-old boy, experienced cough and rhinorrhoea on 1 March 2011 (Figure 2) , followed by conjunctivitis, fever, vomiting, and loose stool (Table 1) . On 7 March, the physician at the Kamalapur Field Clinic found the child's tonsils to be inflamed, diagnosed tonsillitis and conjunctivitis, and collected an NPW specimen, following the enhanced surveillance for influenza [10] . A blood sample was collected, and no organism was isolated from the blood culture. The NPW specimen tested positive for influenza A (H5) on 15 March (Figure 2 ). Patient B did not receive antiviral treatment because >7 days had elapsed since symptom onset. He did not become severely ill or require hospitalization, and he recovered uneventfully.
Ten days before his illness, patient B had touched live poultry while his mother purchased a chicken from a roaming vendor. Blood from the chicken was smeared on his hand when the chicken was eviscerated. The next morning, he cut his hand with the knife his mother was using to prepare the raw chicken meat, and his mother pressed her hand on his wound to stop the bleeding without washing her hands.
Many of their neighbors raised ducks, chickens, and quails in the yard where the child played. Of the 21 families interviewed, 5 families reported ill and dead poultry during the previous 4 weeks. The mother took the child along with her to a live poultry market during the week before his illness. He did not come in contact with any person with acute respiratory illness. Households of the case patients were 1 km apart from each other, and they did not come in contact with each other during the study period. Among the 26 of 29 close contacts of patient B whom we interviewed, 4 reported developing respiratory symptoms. Three close contacts were not available for interview, but they were reportedly in good health.
Laboratory Findings
The CDC isolated HPAI H5N1 viruses both in tissue cell culture and in embryonated eggs from NPW specimens obtained from the 2 case patients and performed full genome sequencing of the isolates. NPW specimens from the 6 healthy family members of the case patients, collected within 10 days after the onset of illness in the case patients, tested negative for influenza A by rRT-PCR. Patient A met the WHO serology criteria for a confirmed H5N1 case (Table 2 ) [12] . Patient B did not meet the WHO criteria for seroconversion but was considered seropositive based on a microneutralization antibody titer ≥40 against A/ Bangladesh/3233/2011 virus in a convalescent specimen collected >14 days after symptom onset and a titer of ≥40 (but not achieving 80, equivalent to WHO protocol criteria of 160) in the horse-red blood cell hemagglutination inhibition assay (Table 2) .
Paired serum samples were obtained from the mothers of both patients and the grandmother of patient A. We could obtain only a single serum sample from the case patients' fathers and the great-grandmother of patient A, because they did not agree to provide a second blood sample. None of the case patients' family members (n = 7) or the contacts who had febrile or respiratory symptoms and consented to provide serum sample (n = 3) had any detectable virus-neutralizing antibodies or any hemagglutination inhibition specific antibodies against the H5N1 virus isolated from patient A. All serum samples from this study were seronegative by both microneutralization and hemagglutination inhibition assays when tested against A/ crow/BD/1061/2011 virus (H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1a).
Influenza A (H5N1) virus was detected by rRT-PCR from a pool of chicken fecal samples collected from 2 live bird markets located within 500 m of the 2 case patients' houses in Kamalapur. Phylogenetic analysis of the hemagglutinin from the isolated HPAI H5N1 virus indicated that it belonged to clade 2.2.2.1 (GISAID accession No. EPI869846). Influenza A (H5N1) virus was also detected by rRT-PCR from the fecal sample collected from a sick crow and a pooled sample of 5 dead crows in the village of patient A's grandparents. Phylogenetic analysis of the hemagglutinin from the HPAI H5N1 viruses detected in this pool indicated that it belonged to clade 2.3.2.1a (GISAID accession No. EPI869847). All other samples collected from animals or animal products during this investigation (ie, swab samples from the meat and viscera of the frozen chickens stored in the freezer [n = 7], cloacal swab samples from ducks [n = 33], oropharyngeal swab samples from chickens [n = 45] and a quail, and swab samples from the poultry sheds of households [n = 14]) tested negative for influenza A (H5N1) virus with rRT-PCR.
DISCUSSION
Our study suggests that direct contact with infected poultry was the likely source of infection for the 2 clinically mild pediatric cases of HPAI H5N1 virus infection in Dhaka detected through a population-based active surveillance, and there was no evidence of subsequent person-to-person transmission. Both case patients had illness onset within 5 days of each other and attended the same health clinic. There was no evidence that they were otherwise epidemiologically linked to each other. We could not ascertain whether they were exposed to poultry from the same source. Nevertheless, the 2 HPAI H5N1 viruses isolated from clinical specimens were identified as clade 2.2.2.1, closely related to each other and the HPAI H5N1 viruses circulating among poultry in Bangladesh during the same time period (Figure 3) . Although other members of the case families were exposed to poultry, none had any evidence of H5N1 virus infection. There was no evidence of HPAI H5N1 virus infection among the 3 identified contacts with acute respiratory illness who underwent serology. HPAI H5N1 viruses are uncommonly transmitted person to person [20] . Although in different outbreaks clusters of HPAI H5N1 virus infection have been reported, those resulted from limited, nonsustained human-to-human transmission among family members, mostly following close, prolonged, unprotected contact with severely ill patients [21, 22] .
Both case patients had a history of contact with poultry in their households, 7 and 10 days before the onset of illness for patients A and B, respectively (Figure 2 ). Patient A also had possible exposure to poultry 3-5 days before her illness onset when she visited her grandparent's house, and patient B visited a live poultry market with his mother during the week before his illness onset. Visiting a live poultry market has been identified as a risk factor for HPAI H5N1 virus infection [23, 24] . Therefore, considering multiple potential exposures for these case patients, their incubation periods are estimated to be 3-10 days, consistent with findings in HPAI H5N1 case patients reported from a study in China, who had multiple exposures to poultry and had an overall median incubation period of 5 days (range, 2-7 days) and a median maximum incubation period of 11.5 days (range, 7-14 days) [25] .
Although patient A met the WHO serology criteria for a confirmed HPAI H5N1 case by demonstrating 4-fold rise in antibody titers, patient B did not [12] . The first serum sample from patient B was collected 15 days after symptom onset and was, therefore, not an acute serum specimen; the delay between symptom onset and acute serum sample collection may explain why there was detection of <4-fold increase in H5N1 virus antibody titer when compared with the convalescent sample. Indeed, HPAI H5N1 virus neutralizing antibody titers were detectable in patient B's first serum samples. Nevertheless, not all HPAI H5N1 virus-infected patients may mount a detectable 4-fold rise in antibody titer. The 2 identified case patients described here had only moderate antibody titers after infection (Table 2) [13] .
Detection of 3 cases of mild HPAI H5N1 illness through population-based surveillance since 2008 [4] suggests the platform's superior sensitivity to detect such events when compared with national sentinel site surveillance, which focuses on more severe cases. Although active population-based surveillance in this community ensured that children with acute respiratory infection are tested for influenza, only 0.03% of children aged <5 years receive care for influenzalike illness and are tested at national influenza surveillance sentinel sites [5, 7, 26, 27] . Indeed, the widespread practice of backyard poultry raising [28, 29] and HPAI H5N1 virus outbreaks occurring among poultry in commercial and backyard poultry farms throughout the country suggest that similar cases may remain undetected throughout Bangladesh in communities where there is no active population based-surveillance.
Influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 virus was in circulation among humans while these children were ill with HPAI H5N1 virus infection [30] , and cocirculation of HPAI H5N1 virus and low pathogenic avian influenza A(H9N2) virus among poultry and wild birds raises the concern of reassortment between these viruses in coinfected persons [31, 32] . In a population with extensive exposure to poultry likely to be infected with avian influenza A virus with minimal biosafety measures [29] , these clinically mild cases highlight the potential for coinfection with both human and avian influenza A viruses. Without a sensitive and robust surveillance system, reassortment would be challenging to detect in its early stages. This evidence suggests that Bangladesh is a possible high-risk environment for such viral reassortment, and active influenza surveillance should continue among persons with exposure to avian influenza A viruses. Worldwide, most surveillance for HPAI H5N1 virus infection in humans is focused on hospitalized and severe cases [33] [34] [35] . Milder cases are, therefore, less likely to be detected, investigated, and reported. Although serosurveys suggest that groups at higher risk have zero to low seropositivity, serosurveys can miss prior infections as antibody titers wane over time [36] . Repeated detection of mildly symptomatic cases in children through this population-based active surveillance and their survival suggest that the case fatality proportion reported among human cases of HPAI H5N1 virus infection might be overestimated [1] . Clinically mild HPAI H5N1 cases have been more frequently reported among young children, and the HPAI H5N1 case fatality proportion is lower in young children than in adults [37] .
Our study had several limitations; we defined as contacts persons who came close to the case patients within 7 days after last identification of H5 viral RNA in NPW specimens of case patients. This might have resulted in inclusion of persons who came close to the case patients when they were not infectious as potential contacts. In addition, we were not able to collect all of the specimens from all identified close contacts, which might have reduced our ability to identify additional secondary cases, especially if contacts had mild symptoms.
Detection of these mild cases through active community surveillance suggest that additional cases might remain undetected in HPAI H5N1 endemic areas under current passive surveillance using sentinel sites. Public health authorities might want to explore the potential value of enhancing surveillance for mild illness from HPAI H5N1 virus infection among humans during the typical avian influenza season in poultry [38] . Interventions to promote safe slaughtering practice and limit close contact with poultry should be developed to reduce the risk of avian-to-human transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus in Bangladesh. The case fatality proportion of HPAI H5N1 influenza among humans should be reassessed using surveillance systems able to detect mild cases in areas where HPAI H5N1 viruses are endemic among poultry.
Notes
